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AUTHORS IN COURT: SCENES FROM THE THEATER OF 
COPYRIGHT, by Mark Rose. Harvard University Press, 2016. 219 pp., 
Hardcover, $29.95. 
 
Reviewed by Robert Spoo 
The University of Tulsa College of Law  
robert-spoo@utulsa.edu 
 
Drama is the master metaphor by which Mark Rose characterizes the six historical 
moments examined in his important book, AUTHORS IN COURT. Each of these 
moments, he argues, is an “exemplary narrative[] . . . which can be read as an 
exploration of the drama of . . . the development of authorship and the law” (p. x). 
Casting history as drama implies narrative tension, conflict, reversal, and 
recognition; it is not quite clear whether Rose feels he has discovered an inherent 
plot or telos in copyright history, or whether he is acknowledging the 
craftsmanship of his own lively storytelling, or both. But we need not decide this 
ontological question to derive pleasure and profit from his careful study. Where 
there is drama, there must be dramatis personae, and Rose deploys his dramaturgy 
around vividly drawn authorial figures supported by a cast of lawyers, judges, 
expert witnesses, and accused infringers. His six-act drama raises the curtain on 
Daniel Defoe’s misunderstood satires and dream of authorial property; Alexander 
Pope’s resort to litigation to vindicate his privacy and his copyrights; Harriet 
Beecher Stowe’s bid to control the right to translate her nation-changing book; 
Napoleon Sarony’s ownership of the mental conceptions captured in his celebrity 
photographs; Anne Nichols’ attempt to monopolize plot, character, and setting in 
stage comedy; J.D. Salinger’s use of copyright to combat publicity and 
unwelcome biography; and Jeff Koons’ struggle to make readymade art and 
bankable banality proper subjects for the defense of fair use. 
 
Yet what kind of drama has Rose unveiled for us? What sort of tale does 
copyright’s history unfold? Is this romantic comedy or the theater of the absurd? 
Are we watching a well-made play or listening to the dire chanting of a Greek 
chorus? Would Northrop Frye find archetypal tragedy in the growth of 
copyright’s scope, or wintry satire in the professionalization of authorship?1 At 
the very least, Rose brilliantly stages a complex problem play in which copyright 
law first enthrones the idea of proprietary authorship and then, in hubris and 
avarice, topples the crowned king in a palace coup plotted by the work-for-hire 
doctrine. My one serious regret is that Rose did not add a seventh exemplary act 
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in which that seemingly oxymoronic Macbeth, the corporate author, was shown 
with hands dabbled in the blood of human authorship. The law-abetted split 
between creative labor and capitalist ownership in modern culture industries has 
been richly explored, for example, in Catherine L. Fisk’s WRITING FOR HIRE: 
UNIONS, HOLLYWOOD, AND MADISON AVENUE,2 but Rose stops short of 
this potentially absurdist drama and only hails it from afar. Yet several of his 
subplots take us to the brink of that anxious dénouement: the struggle of Pope and 
Stowe to reap the benefits of professional authorship while maintaining façades of 
gentility and domesticity, respectively; the posturing of Sarony as a photographic 
genius while his uncelebrated cameraman humbly operates the shutter; the idiot-
savant entrepreneurship of Koons who builds an art empire on the simple 
proposition that the ordinary world might be a source of vast profit if the public 
could be taught to swoon before found objects bathed in a glamor of hand-
numbered scarcity and Warholian celebuzz. 
 
The main plot of Rose’s book asks the question, how did copyright law grow 
from merely prohibiting unauthorized literal copies of books to forbidding many 
nonliteral types of exploitation: abridgments, translations, adaptations, use of 
characters, even paraphrase? His chapter on Defoe shows copyright’s construction 
of the author at an early stage. Defoe repeatedly called for a statute that would 
secure authors’ works as their own indefeasible property, and his agitation 
contributed to the passage of the Statute of Anne (1710), “the world’s first 
copyright act” (p. 8). In contrast to earlier licensing acts that sought to control 
seditious texts and other officially disapproved speech, the Statute had the express 
purpose of encouraging learning, making authors the initial owners of a limited 
right to print and reprint their works, “by virtue of [their] literary endeavor” (p. 
10). Alexander Pope’s 1741 lawsuit against the rascally printer Edmund Curll for 
publishing Pope’s letters without permission established a fundamental point of 
copyright law that is still observed today: copyright protects the particular 
concatenation of words set down by the author, not the physical document or 
other tangible medium that embodies them. By detaching the intangible right of 
publication (owned by the author) from the physical letter (owned by the 
recipient), Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, who heard Pope v. Curll, helped advance 
the law from the old printer’s claim of copy-right—the right to print from copy 
acquired from an author—towards the modern idea of an author’s copyright, the 
right to control the intangible work, whatever medium it might inhabit (pp. 24-
25). To conceive of authors’ works as something separate from paper and ink was 
a step towards recognizing “the author’s right of property in the text” (p. 33). The 
tangible-intangible split in Pope v. Curll was a metaphysical surge in the 
abstractive trajectory of intellectual property (p. 90). 
 
Rose points out that in one respect Hardwicke’s decision was essentially an act of 
literary criticism. In concluding that private, familiar letters could be protected by 
a statute that had been framed for the advancement of learning, Hardwicke was 
necessarily “turning critical opinion into legal judgment” (p. 23). Rose’s subplot 
of judge-as-critic is a recurrent theme of his study, and his point could be 
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extended to other judicial performances. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Miller’s 
ruling in Burrow-Giles Lithographic v. Sarony (1884) that a photograph was a 
“writing” and that a photographer was an “author” within the meaning of the U.S. 
Constitution’s Copyright Clause was a bold interpretative act, comparable in 
some ways to a contemporary theorist’s argument that popular culture should be 
granted equal dignity with canonical literature as a subject of criticism and 
pedagogy.3 When Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., concluded that an ordinary 
circus poster could qualify as a pictorial work under U.S. copyright law, he was 
creatively expanding the law to accommodate the detritus of popular culture,4 
even as he was endorsing, according to Barton Beebe, “an ‘accumulationist’ 
model of progress [that] defines aesthetic progress as simply the accumulation 
over time of more and more aesthetic things.”5 
 
Judicial determinations of fair use are often acts of aesthetic interpretation. Where 
one judge finds copyright infringement in the unauthorized use of a photograph to 
construct a sculpture of puppies, another might find fair use as a matter of artistic 
transformation or parodic purpose. Justice David Souter’s landmark opinion in 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music (1994), with its influential distinction between 
parody and satire, is as much a seminar in literary genres as a ruling on fair use.6 
The growth of transformative fair use as a powerful defense in the twenty years 
between Salinger v. Random House and Blanch v. Koons7 shows the judicial 
mind opening to the lawful possibilities of postmodern collage, allusion, parody, 
and intertextuality. “Inevitably,” Rose writes, “the determination of what is or is 
not ‘transformative’ is subject to critical discrimination” (p. 183). 
 
Harriet Beecher Stowe tried to expand authors’ rights by pushing copyright 
further along its metaphysical path. But her lawsuit against the publisher of an 
unauthorized German translation of her bestselling antislavery novel UNCLE 
TOM’S CABIN (1852) failed to add an exclusive translation right to copyright’s 
bundle. In Stowe v. Thomas, Justice Robert Grier held that, prior to publication, 
an author’s “dominion” over her thoughts, ideas, and sentiments was “perfect,” 
but, once published, her conceptions were “given . . . to the world” as “common 
property,” and she was left with only the “exclusive right to multiply the copies of 
that particular combination” of words.8 Unauthorized translation, because it was a 
re-clothing of ideas, sentiments, and characters freely gifted to the world through 
the decision to publish, could not infringe the author’s narrow right to protect “the 
precise words” of her book (p. 90). As Rose points out, the 1870 U.S. Copyright 
Act would later vindicate Stowe’s position by codifying an author’s translation 
right (p. 90), but in 1853 the law was not ready for such an expansive novelty. 
Infringement lay in literal copying, not nonliteral translation.  
 
In a fascinating passage, Rose analyzes the strange literary-critical moment in 
Justice Grier’s opinion when he played on “the idea of Stowe as a slave owner” 
suing to control her characters through legal monopoly while preaching an 
abolitionist politics of non-ownership in her novel (pp. 58-59). Rose suggests that 
Grier, a supporter of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law, was flinging a “gratuitous 
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insult” at Stowe (p. 59), but I wonder if Grier’s edgy dictum went somewhat 
deeper. In his opinion, he remarked that Stowe’s characters “Uncle Tom and 
Topsy are . . . publici juris [and] may be used and abused by imitators, play-rights 
[sic] and poetasters.”9 The quip hints that, if Stowe had wanted to maintain the 
perfect dominion over her characters that she now contends for as a litigant, she 
should have kept them confined to the plantation of her imagination and not 
manumitted them in the pages of a published volume. Uncle Tom and Topsy may 
now be lawfully exploited by anyone, subjected to all manner of nonliteral 
copying in the ruthless and degrading literary marketplace. This was more than 
the language of insult; it was the rhetoric of paternalism that many Southerners 
employed to justify the institution of slavery in the mid-1800s. The slaveholder’s 
relationship to the slave, this rhetoric declared, was that of a kind father to his 
vulnerable child, a form of protective kindness and solicitude that radical 
Northerners would cruelly destroy by freeing slaves to enter a world that would 
use and abuse them. Slaveholders “recoiled from the suggestion that their slaves 
would be better off as free men,” according to scholars of American slavery.10 
Justice Grier’s barb hinted that the scornful treatment to which Stowe’s thought-
slaves were now exposed in the writer’s marketplace would be visited on actual 
freed slaves, should her abolitionist dream become law. 
 
The playwright Anne Nichols also sought to control the nonliteral elements of a 
popular work, her smash-hit stage comedy “Abie’s Irish Rose” (1922). When 
Universal Pictures failed to obtain rights to adapt Nichols’ play for the screen, the 
company bought the rights to a different play and then altered it to resemble the 
central theme of “Abie’s Irish Rose”: ethnic conflict between an Irish family and 
a Jewish family, complicated by a romance between a son and a daughter from 
each. Nichols sued Universal over the resulting movie, THE COHENS AND 
KELLYS (1926), and hired an attorney, Moses L. Malevinsky, who also served as 
her expert witness in the case. Malevinsky had authored THE SCIENCE OF 
PLAYWRITING,11 in which he claimed that any drama could be analytically 
reduced to its emotional components by an algebraic formula, and that this 
algebra could be employed to detect plagiarism: “A plus B plus C of the 
Algebraic Formula when paralleled in two plays proves infringement” (p. 99).  
 
This write-by-numbers approach to literary composition had a certain vogue in 
the early decades of the twentieth century. Hudson Maxim, the U.S. inventor of 
smokeless gunpowder, argued in his book THE SCIENCE OF POETRY AND 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE that the mysteries of poetic composition 
could be cleared up by a scientific approach to the subject. Maxim coined the 
words “potentry” and “tro-potentry” to characterize the power of great lines, and 
gave examples of his own scientifically created verse, even offering a 
methodological rewrite of Hamlet’s soliloquy to illustrate “continuous primary 
rhythm”: “How fear doth poise us on the brink of death, / Between contending 
purposes.”12 An illustration in the volume showing Maxim taming a bucking 
Pegasus as if it were a wild bronco gives an idea of the confidence that lay behind 
his project.13 The American poet Ezra Pound mocked Hudson’s theorizing as 
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pretentious and parochial, “designed, in short, for the store-post-office audience in 
Canastota and Pipe’s End.”14 Yet this faith in a rational skeleton key to literature 
stretched back at least to Edgar Allan Poe’s “Philosophy of Composition” (1846) 
and can be found in sophisticated forms in Frye’s archetypal criticism and in the 
recurrent textual patterns discovered by literary structuralism. Malevinsky’s 
algebraic formula, which Rose describes as bearing “the marks of a quirky 
autodidact” (p. 99), operated at the ideal level of malleable abstraction for finding 
plagiaristic similarities in popular drama. He was the perfect lawyer and expert 
witness for Nichols, who was indignant over nonliteral parallels between her play 
and Universal’s movie. Universal had done something more economically 
threatening than simply borrowing words and speeches from her play: it had 
become a competitor for audience response to her story about blind love 
overcoming family prejudice, her comic rewriting of “Romeo and Juliet.” 
 
Judge Learned Hand, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
rejected Nichols’ claims and Malevinsky’s algebraic analysis, holding that 
Universal had taken no more than general plot elements, comedic conventions, 
and stock characters. Famously, Hand set forth in his eloquent opinion what has 
come to be known as the “abstraction test”:  
 
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of 
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and 
more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more 
than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at 
times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this 
series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since 
otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his ‘ideas,’ to 
which, apart from their expression, his property is never 
extended.15 
 
Rose suggests, persuasively, that Judge Hand may have formulated his abstraction 
test partly in response to the battle of experts in the lower court (pp. 106-09). 
Indeed, Hand’s application of the abstraction test turned Malevinsky’s algebra on 
its head, finding non-infringement in the common emotional elements that the 
expert had proudly identified as evidence of unlawful copying. Hand located 
copyright’s commons precisely where Malevinsky had found invaded property. 
An irony of the litigation is that Hand complained in his opinion about the use of 
expert witnesses in copyright cases (p. 107). He felt that they invaded the 
province of the fact-finder, substituting pedantic dissections and intricate charts 
for “the firmer, if more naïve, ground of [the court’s] considered impressions 
upon its own perusal.”16 Yet his abstraction test, elaborated and refined, has been 
the basis of much expert testimony in copyright cases of recent decades, 
especially those involving software and other technical subject matter. 
 
One of Rose’s storylines is the tension between expansion and contraction in 
copyright’s metaphysics, between authors’ rights and users’ privileges. Pope’s 
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lawsuit broke ground by splitting the intangible work from the tangible medium. 
Sarony’s litigation showed that posed photographs could be the basis of authorial 
property. Yet, in contrast to these growth spurts, the translation right came slowly 
to U.S. copyright law, as Stowe learned; and general plotlines, common settings, 
and indistinctly marked characters remain as unprotected today as they were for 
Anne Nichols. Copyright expands until it overreaches and impinges on the 
common pool of materials necessary for others to engage in creativity. Then there 
is a halt and a readjustment. 
 
Rose’s final two chapters shift the focus from plaintiff authors to defendant 
copiers, and from the changing shape of authors’ rights to the dynamic 
development of the fair use defense. Yet these chapters are also about authors, 
because the defendants in the Salinger and Koons cases engaged in quoting and 
copying precisely in order to create. Ian Hamilton quoted from and paraphrased 
Salinger’s private letters with the intention of crafting a biography in which the 
reclusive author’s voice could be heard as a rich melody distinct from Hamilton’s 
own ground bass. Salinger’s quoted letters lent individuality and authenticity to 
Hamilton’s account. Koons copied from photographic kitsch and fashion ads in 
order to transpose the banal and the mundane to the key of postmodern irony. 
Rose’s narrative account of the growth of transformative fair use through the 
Salinger and Koons cases brings human color and pathos to one of copyright 
law’s most complex and unpredictable areas. Here, Hamilton and Koons, though 
accused of infringing authors’ rights, become the authors in court. Rose shows 
that transformative fair use is more than just a change in the direction of a murky 
doctrine; rather, it recognizes the fundamentally creative dimension of copying: 
copying for a purpose beyond copying. Just as copyright’s history shows an 
extension of authors’ rights to nonliteral forms of their works, so the story of fair 
use is a gradual recognition of the social and aesthetic value of nonliteral copying. 
 
Rose’s six-act drama is a worthy successor to his groundbreaking AUTHORS 
AND OWNERS.17 As in that book, he anchors copyright law in clear storytelling. 
Each chapter gives us more than just the facts and the law; it also shows 
authorship struggling to shape itself in relation to property and its discontents, 
eager to ensure that being an owner is not inconsistent with being an author. The 
chief characters sometimes strangely echo one another within their moment and 
across time. Stowe tries to make property-owning consistent with being a wife 
and mother; Pope plots and contrives to be a copyright-enforcing author without 
taking on the taint of ungentlemanly professionalism. Pope and Salinger—
separated by two hundred and fifty years, and as different as two authors could 
be—converge in using copyright to enforce controversial claims to privacy. 
Napoleon Sarony is a diminutive dandy every bit as committed to flamboyant 
showmanship as his famous photographic subject, Oscar Wilde. Jeff Koons is in 
some ways a reincarnation of Wilde, demanding deference to his aesthetic whims 
and decrees, expecting to be richly rewarded for his aesthetic audacity, absolutely 
certain of the division between art and non-art yet constantly bringing the two into 
subversive contact. Rose’s chapter on Koons, “Purloined Puppies,” is easily the 
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best account ever written of the Koons litigations, largely because Koons emerges 
here as a complex artist and businessman, thoughtful and dedicated in his way, far 
from the cardboard charlatan and greedy clown that he is often depicted as being. 
Rose tells copyright law’s stories with great skill and humanity. In addition to its 
value as a scholarly monograph, AUTHORS IN COURT would be an excellent 
supplementary text for courses on intellectual property, copyright, and piracy in 
law schools and graduate and undergraduate programs. 
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In my home city in 2014, a 20-year-old provocateur and his friend launched a 
guerrilla art project called Rainworks, sneaking around Seattle and surreptitiously 
creating works of art using sidewalks as canvasses.1 These works were created 
with paint and super-hydrophobic coatings which rendered them invisible until 
rain darkened the pavement around the art work and caused a message suddenly 
to “appear.” The works “disappeared” again as the concrete dried, and the paint—
and thus this reappearing-disappearing act—lasted for two to four months in each 
work. In a climate famous for its rainy weather, the opportunities to see these 
works abounded, and the desire for distraction, or a lift in spirits caused by 
finding hidden works, had intuitive appeal. Rainworks was designed to make 
people glad that it was raining: sort of an anodyne idea, the smiley-face emoji 
version of installation art. Consider the mission: “Rainworks are positive 
messages and art that appear when it rains. Their purpose: To turn rainy days into 
something to look forward to!” The everybody-wins ethos of Rainworks’ writings 
is exemplified physically in its paint, which is nontoxic and biodegradable, with 
solvent that evaporates. Rainworks clearly aims to avoid offending; its point is not 
to foment revolution at the bus stop. At the same time, and in spite of its do-
gooderism, its legal status as art was a little iffy: before Rainworks started 
working with the City of Seattle and the Seattle Department of Transportation, the 
project was technically illegal, a form of cheery trespass.2 Claiming ownership of 
these works might have been difficult under U.S. copyright law, the legal domain 
most central to regulating art, because of the requirement that works be “fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression,” and perhaps for public policy reasons. (I have 
argued elsewhere that fixation need not be a bar to copyrightability in conceptual 
works of art that change in certain predictable ways like these did, though it is not 
certain that the U.S. Copyright Office, or indeed courts, would agree.)3   
 
Still, Rainworks is art that started life in liminality, traced in the margins of urban 
textuality. Through municipal blessing, it has gone mainstream, moved to the 
body of the text, shifted status from illicit street art to sanctioned public art. But it 
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began life, at least in theory, as a crime. This is the complex status of graffiti and 
other unauthorized forms of street art: it may display creativity, create community 
cohesion, and enable individual self-fashioning through artistic expression, yet it 
tends to have these benefits overshadowed, and undertheorized, because of its 
legal status as marginal or even criminal. Through the inevitable politics that 
shape policy and scholarship, graffiti and its creative subculture have been, if not 
invisible, nonetheless not fully seen. 
 
Marta Iljadica’s new book, COPYRIGHT BEYOND LAW: REGULATING 
CREATIVITY IN THE GRAFFITI SUBCULTURE provides a thorough 
investigation of graffiti’s role in contemporary life, understood through issues of 
creativity, law, and urban space.  In her investigation of graffiti’s subculture, she 
identifies a “bounded commons” that governs the attitudes and norms of the 
artists within it. Relying on semistructured interviews and personal observation, 
she identifies rules that govern and safeguard graffiti’s practice as an embodied 
form of art, always linked to its physical environment, and undergirded by 
sociological, aesthetic, and moral norms. The “graffiti rules” exist sometimes in 
parallel with copyright, and sometimes in supplementary or substitutive form, 
generally there to protect the work, the practice, and the community (p. 295). 
Iljadica’s curiosity and diligent empirical research provide copyright scholars 
with a richly rewarding exploration of alternative frameworks for regulating 
creativity. Iljadica writes that the project began with her surprise upon 
discovering, through a friend’s offhand comment, that tagging a church or car was 
not considered acceptable within the graffiti subculture; she realized there were a 
set of hidden rules she had never seen, and had not known she wasn’t seeing (p. 
63). 
 
Perhaps as a way of prompting us to a similar flash of insight, Iljadica’s book 
opens with an engaging epigraph. “A Note on Pictures” appeared unexpectedly, 
rather like a Rainworks writing, and then disappeared from view as I made my 
way into the book. Yet its message remained in the back of mind as I read, and it 
came to take on deeper significance as I thought about the aspirations of the book 
as a whole. The epigraph is there to warn readers not to expect pictures of graffiti 
in the book, and it telegraphs information, between the lines, about readerly 
expectations; the way in which permissions operate in publishing and may 
sometimes constrain authorship; the care Iljadica displays for graffiti creators’ 
creations whether or not they are copyright protected; and the deeper message 
behind her method. This is not a book about the content and messages of the 
graffiti themselves (pp. 66-67); it seeks instead to describe the attitudes toward 
creation, ownership, and copying that are manifest in graffiti’s subcultural system. 
To do that, it doesn’t need pictures as much as it needs readers willing to open 
their minds and perhaps their eyes. Iljadica writes: 
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[R]ather than seeing here examples of graffiti creativity outside 
the cultural and spatial context in which they reside, I invite you 
to walk the city; to seek out graffiti writing (and street art, too). 
See the names repeating. See the forms of graffiti creativity takes 
(and those it doesn’t) and the places in which it is found (and 
those in which it isn’t). None of this is an accident. 
 
Iljadica urges readers to explore the world around them, seeking visual clues in 
graffiti, looking for repetitions, forms, names, and omissions. She calls readers to 
observational attention and, by directing them to look for things in the negative 
(forms graffiti doesn’t take; places graffiti doesn’t appear), she invites readers to 
imagine, to fill gaps and draw inferences. Lastly, she instructs them to trust that 
what they are seeing is not there by accident, but by design, part of a hidden 
subcultural order that many do not understand and scarcely imagine to be a 
vibrant artistic ecosystem with high standards of originality and ethics, as well as 
clear rules about how and where graffiti writers create their art. In asking us to 
attend to our own vision, she is asking that we begin, in effect, by opening our 
eyes to what is around us, to what she will later describe, quoting Anne Barron, as 
a world hidden from view, unseen “except as an environment for economic 
activity” (p. 292). Copyright’s dominant stories about artistic creation and its 
regulation are heavily skewed towards economic frameworks, and that bias has at 
times kept more accurate, and more pluralistic views out of sight. Of course, more 
empirically and phenomenologically accurate accounts require time, fieldwork, 
methodological rigor, and a commitment to the value of undertaking such 
resource-intensive work. Happily, Iljadica has volunteered. Her book takes 
readers on a listening and imagining tour as she guides us through her experience 
of that world, showing us how graffiti writers work, what matters to them, and 
what shapes their community governance. Her work provides an opportunity to 
undo a politics of invisibility that obscures graffiti writers, their process and their 
mores. 
 
Iljadica’s thoughtful approach to structuring the book displays loving craft, 
signaled on the surface by adopting her interviewees’ term “panel,” but going 
much deeper. Iljadica artfully weaves themes through the book, moving between 
empirical, historical, quasi-sociological, and doctrinal discussion in a way that 
rewards a linear reading. At times, those of us who publish in law review articles 
chafe at the format: articles can seem organized inorganically, as though 
programmed by a word processor’s automated outline function, and one suspects 
(with no claims about cause or correlation) that these same articles are likely to be 
read instrumentally (readers may read the one relevant section, Part IV on willful 
infringement for instance, to the exclusion of the rest). To be clear, those of us in 
that publishing ecosystem may all be guilty at times of both organizing and 
reading in instrumental, uninspired fashion. Lawyers, and law professors, are 
epistemologically inclined towards instrumentalism, a hard habit to break in a 
field where client-oriented service, persuasive advocacy, and time-keeping norms 
mark the profession in particular ways.  Nonetheless, that professional backdrop 
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makes reading COPYRIGHT BEYOND LAW—a work beautifully 
conceptualized and immanently ordered, a book meant to be taken in 
holistically—a genuine joy to read. The book is organized in sections, or panels, a 
term Iljadica borrows from graffiti writers who use it to refer to the section of a 
train carriage on which to work (p. 4). Each panel is further subdivided into one to 
three chapters that painstakingly approach the subject of graffiti from various 
interdisciplinary perspectives. In what follows, I provide brief summaries and 
comments on each panel.  
 
In her opening panel, “Context,” Iljadica historicizes graffiti, and situates it in the 
framework of copyright theory. Chapter 1 provides a helpful history of graffiti’s 
development, a working definition of graffiti (and its relationship to street art and 
public art), and observations about a particular location (London). She explains 
some of the characteristics of the graffiti subculture, providing vivid snapshots of 
why and how graffiti artists create. Iljadica captures the sense of exhilaration 
writers may feel upon tagging a train, or achieving otherwise difficult artistic 
feats, and she acknowledges the legally risky, if not downright illegal nature of 
her interviewees’ chosen art. Iljadica positions the practice as liminal but not 
negatively so. By contrast, much of the work in this area categorizes it as though 
its illegality were presumed, or a core characteristic of it; Iljadica refers to this as 
“normativity against graffiti writers” (p. 65). 
 
In the second chapter, “Copyright, Creativity and Commons,” Iljadica 
summarizes the utilitarian view of copyright’s purpose, as well as existing 
critiques of it. Her assessment is both sweeping and concise, a valuable summary 
of the scholarly debate for those new to it. This section also makes a contribution 
in its own right for those in our field who have long felt stifled and perplexed by 
the dominance of the economic view and in search of a more heterogeneous view 
of copyright, one based on values and exogenous reasoning than on economic 
theories and endogenous assumptions. Iljadica points out that “[a] noted flaw of 
the law and economics approach in justifying copyright is precisely its inability to 
explain why encouraging creativity is a social benefit in the first place” (p. 35).  
Her assessment of the flaws of law-and-economics-style utilitarianism may help 
explain why qualitative empirical research is so important. By attuning 
researchers to what matters within a given creative community, we can ask and 
answer better questions. By uncovering what artists actually do, and think, and 
feel, and need, we can consider regulation of creativity from a range of 
perspectives and with more accurate information that tracks practices and 
attitudes in the world rather than hewing to an abstract, theoretical model of what 
a rational actor in a given situation does to maximize her interests.  
 
Iljadica builds on important scholarship by Betsy Rosenblatt and Estelle Derclaye 
that suggests the importance of belonging and happiness respectively to human 
flourishing. Turning to other researchers (Julie Cohen, Jessica Silbey, Rebecca 
Tushnet) who have explored creativity and why creators create, Iljadica cites love, 
esteem, play, pleasure and other non-property-oriented benefits that have no 
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obvious place in a copyright world structured by commodity culture and market-
driven thinking. More radically still, perhaps, Iljadica suggests we could 
recalibrate copyright protection in order to maximize happiness rather than an 
optimal balance of incentives and access (p. 39). In other words, Iljadica does not 
just critique the dominant market-centered philosophy underpinning copyright. 
She advocates for its wholesale reorientation around ethics and empirics instead 
of “the fallacious idea of progress” (p. 39). She turns to the idea of a “bounded 
commons” for graffiti writers to unite the importance of physical space with the 
“library of styles” they collectively govern, in an intellectual commons that exists 
outside copyright law (p. 49). The graffiti writing community has an incentive to 
participate in the norms of the commons because membership matters, and those 
outside the group will be treated differently. Their participation in graffiti writing, 
and compliance with graffiti rules becomes “a social practice of commoning” (p. 
55, internal citation omitted).  
 
The third chapter of this Panel shifts gears into a more colloquial tone as Iljadica 
tells the story of her research design and experience. She conducted 29 formal 
interviews and analyzed them following grounded theory practices. She 
supplemented these by conducting extensive supplementary research and with her 
own fieldwork, traveling through the city and other cities. 18 months into a 
qualitative empirical research project studying craft brewers in Seattle, I must say 
I found this section especially gripping and impressive: this kind of work is a 
labor of love, and it requires a certain amount of both faith, and courage. Like 
Iljadica, I eventually had to move from reading to practice, jumping into action at 
a certain point because there is no substitute for doing in this arena. Her 
discussing of taking sides was especially valuable; I found myself taking a side in 
interviews quite naturally, for some of the same reasons Iljadica tells us she did 
(p. 73). Still, I often wondered what an ideal calibration looked like. The empathy 
and engagement with a particular subculture can be a genuine and also helpful 
stance to strike even if it does not pretend to achieve “objectivity,” or perhaps 
precisely because it doesn’t. Iljadica’s work in this area is unique in its focus on 
illegal subcultural activity, and the methods section was interesting to read for the 
complexities that aspect introduced. Ultimately, I wondered about some issues 
that I did not see discussed at length, including the gender, age, and ethnicity of 
participants. Is graffiti writing macho or masculinist (as I would speculate) and 
what are the ways for girls and women to participate, if so? What are the class and 
other identity factors that make belonging to this community easier or harder? 
Iljadica notes her own positionality as an outsider (p. 68) under suspicion (p. 70) 
and that being a woman generally might contribute to that outsider status (p. 71). I 
wanted more discussion of these factors, and how they created both norms of 
inclusion and exclusion that might shape the graffiti subcultural commons.  
 
The book’s middle sections (panels 2, 3, and 4) all juxtapose copyright rules with 
the graffiti rules Iljadica identifies in her empirical chapters. Her aim is to map 
departures, adherence, and various misalignments between the two regimes. Panel 
2 is about “the relevance of form and placement to creativity,” but it is also an 
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exploration of graffiti’s status in the eyes of copyright law and its subject matter 
requirements. Chapter 4 presents an ontological inquiry into what counts to make 
certain activity be considered art, or original, or indeed, a unit of work that can 
and should be measured as such under either the graffiti or copyright paradigms. 
The juxtaposition here helps denaturalize copyright law: there is nothing 
particularly necessary about the lines it draws, and at times, those lines will not 
map well onto a subculture or practice.   
 
Additionally, Iljadica provides helpful background for this and other American 
readers, allowing them to follow a few of the doctrinal divergences between U.K. 
Copyright Law and EU Copyright Law (which divergences may take on 
additional significance given BREXIT). She is especially helpfully in discussing 
the paradox of graffiti: it might be doubly copyrightable in some instances (as 
literary work and as visual work under the Copyright, Design and Patents Act 
1988 (“CDPA”)); but it may be uncopyrightable --either on the grounds that it is a 
single word, name, or short phrase (pp. 95-96), or on public policy grounds based 
on the theory that if placed in such way that it creates civil or criminal liability, 
perhaps copyright ought not to place a stamp of approval on it through legal 
protection (pp. 102-103).  
 
The third panel centers on copying. Chapters 6 and 7 analyze copyright’s 
originality and authorship doctrines, as well as their counterparts in the graffiti 
rules. Iljadica catalogs ways in which authorial choices matter in both domains, 
and contrasts their standards for originality. Her treatment of authorship and joint 
authorship was brief but illuminating, and suggests the need for continuing work 
on how collaborative subcultural creativity governed by norms misaligns with 
formal law and may be chilled by regulation, thus suppressing socially beneficial 
expression. Iljadica demonstrates that this misalignment holds true with respect to 
reproduction, which copyright law paints in very broad brushstrokes but which 
subcultural communities like this one tend to treat in much more nuanced and 
variegated fashion. Graffiti writers think of some copying as derivative but some 
as necessary and helpful, and the qualitative nature of the copying and the works 
may matter (pp. 163, 182). Relatedly, the inability of the lay eye to discern 
differences in graffiti writings may cause further difficulty in grafting the law’s 
concept of reproduction onto the graffiti rules (p. 163). 
 
A minor point of confusion for me may lie in a terminological choice. Throughout 
the book, and in these middle sections, there occasionally appeared to be some 
slippage between “rules” and “norms” (p. 3, for instance, uses graffiti rules and 
norms interchangeably but elsewhere there appeared to be a difference between 
the two). Norms, as I understand them, are informal rules that derive from a 
community’s practice and beliefs, backed by a sanction. To the extent no sanction 
exists, then behaviors could be caused by reasons other than compliance with 
norms, and statements of community values cast as norms could be merely 
precatory aspirations or statements of belief, with no teeth. The reasons graffiti 
writers choose to adopt original styles, or choose to write in certain places, could 
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of course be due to a norm against biting and other graffiti rules, but these reasons 
could also have to do with the desire for fame, the sense of thrill and risk, and the 
desire to make a mark in a hard-to-reach highly visible area, for the bragging 
rights and sense of achievement. If sanctions operate forcefully, other reasons 
may be present, but as long as the sanctions are meaningful ones, we would 
normally presume that they matter to community members, and contribute to 
shaping behavior. Because Iljadica notes that “graffiti writers recognize but do not 
always enforce, norms that demonstrate striking similarities and telling departures 
from copyright rules,” I wondered whether I understand norms in the same way 
she does (p. 4). Insisting on a distinction between them helps avoid behavioral 
reductivism, or a collapse between practices and the reasons behind them, as 
Iljadica undoubtedly knows. For this reader perhaps, the distinction could have 
been made slightly clearer, perhaps by defining those two central terms more 
finely. To the extent that behavior is prohibited by norms, or perhaps unavailable 
or unattractive for other reasons, it may become important to know. When Iljadica 
writes of compelled forbearance of IP rights, for instance (p. 61), the implication 
is that would-be plaintiffs cannot seek legal remedies for copying of their own 
illegal works. But would they if they could? In the area I study, there is a 
forbearance norm under many circumstances; that of course tells a different story. 
The point may be a minor one, but the norms/rules distinction helps sort the 
reasons for decisionmaking about creativity and law. Ultimately, Iljadica’s larger 
points concern the interplay between graffiti rules and copyright rules, and those 
stand regardless of this question of terminology and the intended distinction 
between norms and rules. 
 
The fourth panel discusses creators’ reputational interests, and the means of 
protecting those available under graffiti subculture norms, and copyright (or 
trademark) law. This discussion is especially interesting for American readers, 
whose copyright system is well known for rejecting most forms of moral rights 
like those that, in other copyright regimes, protect reputation through rights of 
integrity and attribution. To the extent that UK copyright law aligns in some 
respects with what graffiti artists want, it does so in some instances through moral 
rights that the U.S. copyright law largely excludes from its system. I am not here 
advocating for moral rights in the U.S.; my point is both less prescriptive and less 
sure that moral rights help more than hinder. However, it should give us some 
hesitation in this country as empirical scholarship continues to show that authors 
and artists may not be getting what they need from U.S. copyright law, but might 
be able to get more of that if moral rights were available through law. Of course, 
Iljadica’s compelling study demonstrates that norms play an important role, and in 
some, or many cases, their availability may be better and cheaper than the 
strongest moral rights available at law (p. 291). 
 
Iljadica also shows how evaluation of the work’s merit plays a role in graffiti’s 
subcultural governance norms. This kind of value-definition is typically outside 
the scope of copyright law, which at least nominally purports to strike a position 
of aesthetic non-discrimination. Interestingly, the graffiti rules here track the 
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intuitive position of many subcultural communities; aesthetic valuation is fine if it 
is controlled by and within the community, for the purposes of reputational 
advancement or other opportunities. Iljadica’s work helps show that the point at 
which aesthetic valuation becomes a problem is when courts are in charge of it, 
and empowered to award or withhold property rights on its basis.  
 
The book’s final panel features a chapter of suggested reforms for copyright, and 
a stirring conclusion about the jurisprudential stakes of truly seeing graffiti for 
what it is, and can be, in the larger context of copyright’s regulation of both 
creativity and public space.  COPYRIGHT BEYOND LAW allows us to shine a 
light on copyright’s internal structures and biases, and perhaps consider reforms 
Iljadica lays out. Yet she cautions against using the study instrumentally to 
improve copyright; her suggestion instead is to allow it to inform a more 
pluralistic, less hegemonic discourse about creativity, and its connections to 
community and space (p. 300).  
 
How one reads graffiti is a function of contextual clues and environmental factors; 
artistic reception is socially constructed. Yet graffiti may correlate with factors in 
the lived world that scrambles its meanings for many who see it. What makes a 
varsity letter jacket “code” one way and a hoodie code another way, for those who 
see them on a young man walking down the street? What work do other factors 
(race, age, size of the wearer) do to inform the way these items are seen, and what 
are the architectural and social features of the landscape that embeds and encodes 
graffiti? What do these clues do to shape policy discourse around graffiti? One 
has only to consider Rainworks, discussed above, for an example of how 
policymakers might talk about graffiti, but for many complex reasons including 
class, race, and gender, usually don’t. The discourse about graffiti, by many 
academics and policymakers alike, comes heavily freighted with assumptions 
about morality and aesthetic value.  
 
A great deal of writing has explored graffiti as an urban phenomenon, though 
regrettably much of it links graffiti to crime or urban troubles, framing it as one 
among many indicators of decline. This version of discourse about graffiti, at least 
in the United States, reinscribes the discriminatory effects, and biases, of an often-
unjust, broken culture of criminal justice and mass incarceration. Some 
scholarship does celebrate graffiti’s capacity for community-building, 
beautification, and individual self-fashioning, even when this art is unlawful, 
though less of such work than one might hope. Yet none has offered an extended 
examination of graffiti as a subcultural activity that can contribute rich insights to 
IP scholarship, which, with its core interests in theorizing and calibrating the 
regulation of creative activity, ought to take notice.  
 
For Iljadica, graffiti is not a symptom of the “broken windows” problem, 
signaling urban neglect and lumped in with activities such as public urination, 
intoxication in public, and other expressions of lawlessness (or sometimes simply 
poverty) that are taken to be urban failures of some kind. On the contrary, graffiti 
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reflects engagement with the territory, and functions as a means of identifying 
people’s belonging to and within that place—note Iljadica’s own sense that 
graffiti is a link to a person, making a city feel safer to her (p. 75). Iljadica’s book 
demonstrates a commitment to taking graffiti seriously on its own terms, which 
includes understanding what sets it off from street art, and when (she mentions the 
“blurred line” between them often). Iljadica discusses a “wide… gulf” between 
graffiti and street art, and it may be that the distinction between the two forms of 
art tracks to some extent their different treatment; graffiti may be cast in negative 
terms, and street art might be cast more positively, more like art than merely 
signatures or territory-markings (to adopt some of the stereotypes about both). To 
see graffiti cast here as a form of art about reputation, visibility, and the lived 
landscape—as well as risk-taking and resistance—is a refreshing change.4 
Iljadica’s work will help conceptualize graffiti in more positive terms, and her 
incisive interdisciplinary analysis will, I hope, advance a conversation among 
scholars of art, sociology, cultural geography, and law. 
 
Notwithstanding this rehabilitative ethos, the book grapples with graffiti’s often 
illegal status: it affects whom Iljadica could interview, and created some anxiety 
discussed in Chapter 3, about the modes and ethics of her interviews. This 
marginal status is one the practice of graffiti continues to experience, made all the 
more visible perhaps by the growing popularity of certain kinds of (sanctioned) 
street art and the overlaps between artistic communities who participate in both. 
The Wynwood neighborhood of Miami comes to mind: a remarkable collection of 
art, including street art, public art and graffiti, graces many walls and surfaces, 
spanning over twenty city blocks. Maps legitimize the collection as tourist 
destinations, and as a collection that coheres, too.5 Yet within that community, 
even those artists who do both graffiti and street art, remain anonymous for fear 
of arrest—some have been to jail and prefer to stay out.6  
 
Iljadica’s study tees up many rich lines of future inquiry. Her sounding notes on 
the market-oriented assumptions of copyright and the commodification of art 
have, for me, lasting resonance. A question for future empirical and theoretical 
work on graffiti writers to take up is the effects of the commodification and 
mainstreaming of forms of street art. Will graffiti as kitsch, as brand, as meta-
signature, coopt graffiti as self-expression and subculture? Will graffiti writers 
actually find more legitimacy in their work based on the increased legitimacy of 
these outdoor tableaux and the sense that the urban landscape is available for 
artistic engagement? Is the album of snapshots Iljadica has taken going to change, 
and if so how? She refers to the graffiti rules as dynamic, not static. IP scholarship 
has not done enough to study the conditions of norm-making, and how market 
pressures may force changes in norms that might push artists either further into 
norms, or out of norms and into formal law. She talks about how graffiti is an act 
of resistance that reclaims urban space from corporate ownership (p. 53), drawing 
on theories of space and the city by Georg Simmel, and Henri LeFebvre. For both 
of them, the scholarly understanding of space required accounting for individual, 
phenomenologically inflected experience while also grappling with social 
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relations structured by modernity, capitalism, and industrialization. Read at a 
broad level, both were concerned in various ways with the everyday struggle of 
the human against the social machinery of the system, shaped as it was by 
economic and political power. Iljadica writes that “space is socially produced, 
[hence] the interpretation of laws, including copyright law, also actively produce 
space” (p. 295). In calling the attention of copyright scholars to its role “in 
producing public space,” she shows how graffiti highlights the sociopolitical 
dimensions of that role (p. 288). The individual, and the subculture, struggle to 
resist, and engage with, and reclaim, the world around them. Graffiti is at once an 
opening salvo, and a response, full of defiance, that creates space for a different 
artistic discourse, and a different lived experience in the city.  
 
As street art and graffiti have gained status in the worlds of art and fashion, 
graffiti has taken on a commodity aspect. There have been numerous instances in 
which designers have used graffiti artists’ work without their permission, or 
following failed attempts to negotiate a license. The logic of the commodity is 
also the logic of the law, of property, and of the right to exclude. In litigation that 
has predictably followed these unauthorized uses, a rhetoric of commodification 
and ownership is visible, and this rhetoric is what wins IP lawsuits: it’s a 
necessary ingredient in most complaints.7 If it is merely rhetorical, reflecting 
compliance with legal pleading requirements, there may be nothing more to say 
about it. But if these lawsuits, and their theories of harm, reflect more than 
rhetoric, might it be that copyright, and IP law, will work to produce a different 
kind of public space, perhaps a diminished intellectual commons? Trademark and 
copyright exert different pressures on rightsholders, and if graffiti writers turn to 
formal law, what will that look like for them, and for the creative communities 
around them? Graffiti may serve many purposes, from self-expression to 
community-building, to expressing resistance. It may also be a writer’s brand, or 
coopted by a large corporate brand seeking to look edgy or fresh. Its status, for 
law, for art, and in the market, merits future attention. 
 
COPYRIGHT BEYOND LAW is a welcome contribution to several ongoing 
conversations in IP scholarship. Its discussion will add to existing legal 
scholarship on subcultural creativity, as well as the law-and-norms and negative 
space scholarship. In particular, the norms scholarship at times suffers from an 
anti-IP bias, or an insistence on viewing the world through a negative-space/low-
IP lens. Here, Iljadica is careful to emphasize that the existence of robust non-
legal norms need not necessarily mean “no ‘rules,’ [through law] but rather, 
‘better rules’; rules which make room for and reflect that which copyright, 
because it cannot, does not” (p. 295). She takes the counterintuitive tack that “the 
study of alternative copyright norms” among graffiti writers “provides support for 
the continued existence of copyright, albeit in an occasionally modified form, 
rather than for its wholesale abolition” (p. 285). In this nuanced approach to 
mapping copyright and graffiti rules, Iljadica avoids the problem of all-or-nothing 
approaches to norms, and provides a model, consistent with intellectual or 
knowledge commons frameworks, of communities in which informal governance 
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and formal regulation can coexist, and perhaps should. The merits of this project 
are many, in its insights about graffiti writing and copyright law, and in the 
persuasive way Iljadica reframes both. 
 
COPYRIGHT BEYOND LAW will provide helpful comparative perspective for 
those U.S. scholars of copyright and subcultural creativity who may find 
themselves with a myopically domestic focus: Iljadica’s work provides much-
needed comparative analysis with important implications for assessing the proper 
role and need for moral rights. Looking outside legal literatures, this work also 
contributes to the larger scholarly conversation on graffiti (and street art), with a 
welcome thumb on the scale that weighs the value of graffiti as a salutary 
sociocultural practice (instead of the normative framing of graffiti as evidence of 
urban decline and criminality). Finally, I think a substantial contribution of this 
book is to add normative heft to the collective and growing body of scholarship 
by other qualitative empirical researchers in IP: the excellence of this book, and 
its insights, call for more work of this kind. Iljadica notes copyright law’s 
“shortcomings in recognizing the process-oriented nature of creativity and the 
space in which it occurs” (p. 288). It is only through qualitative study of the 
process itself, as it is lived by its participants, that we can map the community’s 
practices, attitudes, and norms. Iljadica’s epigraph could be doubly read: first, it is 
as an invitation to develop “graffiti sight” in walking through the city, a flaneur 
with graffiti on the brain. But it could be read at another level as impelling us, 
urgently, to travel through our territories, looking in a new way for different kinds 
of signs and omissions, imagining different kinds of evidence, and opening 
ourselves to a different kind of scholarly vision. 
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Dance may be one of the world’s oldest art forms, but it is a relatively 
recent entrant into the sphere of copyright law—and remains something of 
an afterthought amongst copyright lawyers and scholars alike. For copyright 
scholars, at least, that should change with the publication of Anthea Kraut’s 
CHOREOGRAPHING COPYRIGHT: RACE, GENDER, AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AMERICAN DANCE. Kraut 
performs a fascinating exploration of the evolution of choreographic 
copyright—sweeping, political, polemical—that should leave no one in 
doubt as to the normative significance of choreography as a subject matter 
of copyright law and policy. Nor should doubt remain as to the political 
significance of copyright within the realm of choreography. Choreographic 
copyright, Kraut persuades us, is a key site for the negotiation of subject-
hood and the navigation of shifting power flows. Through carefully 
researched and beautifully narrated case studies that reveal the role of race 
and gender in the allocation of intellectual property rights, Kraut weaves a 
compelling historical and socio-cultural account of copyright’s emergence 
and exploitation on the stages and in the studios of 19th-21st century 
America. 
A scholar of dance, Kraut contributes to an increasingly interdisciplinary 
conversation around the legal structures of the intellectual property system, 
challenging the traditional formal account of copyright law with its facially 
neutral concepts of authorship, originality, ownership, and economic 
incentive. Bringing to bear lessons from dance, performance and cultural 
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studies, critical race scholarship, and critical legal studies, Kraut expertly 
deconstructs the edifice of copyright law to reveal the gendered and 
racialized assumptions of value and social hierarchy on which its 
foundations lie. Perfectly adept at explaining the law and its development 
through statute, regulation, and case law, Kraut confidently engages with 
the legal scholarship on the nature of copyright while also seamlessly 
drawing on a rich body of literature on dance history and philosophy, 
anthropology and ethnography. The contribution that this book makes to the 
field of dance and theatre studies has already received worthy 
recognition1—but it is the interdisciplinary light that it sheds on the legal 
theorizing of copyright in dance and beyond with which I am most 
impressed. In particular, Kraut’s book should be welcomed as an important 
contribution to legal scholarship in the blossoming areas of copyright and 
choreography; intellectual property, race and gender; and intellectual 
property’s negative spaces.  
In the first regard, the book adds greatly to a surprisingly small body of 
academic scholarship grappling with copyright law’s treatment of 
choreographic works.2 Coming from a legal perspective, such works 
typically focus on the significant doctrinal challenges involved in, for 
example, parsing protectable original expression from public domain 
“social dance steps and simple routines;” separating the choreographic 
“work” from the “system, method or mode of operation” that copyright 
ought not to protect; adequately fixing the choreographic work in a stable, 
material form that allows the work to be protected, registered and readily 
identifiable; and untangling the ownership claims of dance companies, 
choreographers, and performers. Each of these challenges presents 
fascinating practical and policy questions for legal scholars to examine, 
pressing not just at the subtle incoherencies of choreographic copyright but 
revealing the uncertainties inherent in copyright law at large. Kraut 
recognizes these doctrinal challenges as she tackles particular cases, but 
refuses to reduce them to interesting questions of law: rather, they play at 
the peripheries of a much larger challenge—revealing the inherently 
political nature of recognizing, defining, allocating, and circumscribing 
copyright in choreographic works.  
In this political vein, Kraut’s book also represents a major contribution to 
the legal scholarship at the intersection of intellectual property, race, and 
gender. This vital area of critical concern has emerged, over the past decade 
or two, to occupy a central place in critical legal approaches to copyright, 
radically unsettling the long-held notion that its privileges apply equally 
across cultural, geographic, racial, gender, and economic divides to anyone 
who can objectively lay claim to the label of “original author.” Beginning 
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with the work of scholars such as K.J. Greene (who is thanked in this book) 
and Rosemary Coombe (whose work Kraut describes as instrumental to her 
thinking) (p. 35),3 a community of critical scholars has shown that the law’s 
labels are differentially bestowed upon certain creators and genres of 
creative expression depending on the identity of the author(s), the perceived 
value of the work within the dominant culture, and the social context from 
which the author speaks.4 Of course, it should be no surprise that racial and 
gender inequalities permeate copyright law as they do any other area of our 
law and society, subordinating some voices for the valorization, 
amplification, and economic benefit of others. What Kraut demonstrates, 
through her examination of the ebbs and flows of copyright in 
choreography, however, is the extent to which the recognition or denial of 
copyright has always depended on the dancer or choreographer’s “position 
in a raced, gendered and classed hierarchy, and on the historical conditions 
in which they made, and made claims on, their dances” (p. xiii). Nuanced in 
its telling but simple in its essence, Kraut’s argument is that “choreographic 
copyright emerged out [and so retains] the same racialized logic of property 
that has persistently treated some bodies as fungible commodities and 
others as possessive individuals” (p. xviii). Through one choreographer’s 
story after another, Kraut tells us how, “although race and gender rarely 
surfaced as explicit factors in dancers’ pursuit of copyright protection or in 
the law’s uneven bestowal of that protection, choreographic copyright has 
served to consolidate and to contest racial and gendered power” (p. xiii).    
CHOREOGRAPHING COPYRIGHT should also be received as a welcome 
addition to the so-called “negative space” literature: the growing body of 
academic work that examines what happens in creative communities when 
intellectual property protection is absent, whether in law or in practice.5 
From the perspective of the legal scholar, the purpose of these forays into 
different and often marginalized communities of creative practice is often to 
unsettle assumptions about the incentive structures established through law, 
and to explore how these map onto (or fail to map onto) people’s actual 
decision-making about what and how to create, or shared norms around 
when and how to copy (or not). Kraut’s exposition reveals the extent to 
which the dance world—whether of late nineteenth century theatres, early 
twentieth century stages, or twenty-first century streets—offers a perfect 
example of how creativity thrives and norms of sharing develop in the 
general absence of formalized legal claims over—or recognition of—
expressive works as such. Nonetheless, the denial of copyright to particular 
creative communities and particular actors within or at the margins of those 
communities remains subject to powerful critique as a mode of 
“invisibilization” (pp. ix-x).6 At the same time, Kraut acknowledges and 
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warns of the way in which the vesting of copyright—particularly in the 
embodied choreographic expression of the dancer—threatens to exacerbate 
the kind of objectification and commodification to which gendered and 
racialized bodies have historically been subjected.   
Thus, with the natural balance of the proverbial ballerina, Kraut tip toes 
along the narrow line that many legal commentators struggle to hold. Kraut 
succeeds, to my mind, where others have faltered: at once and convincingly 
condemning the denial of recognition that the refusal of intellectual 
property rights can represent, while sustaining a critical skepticism of the 
proprietary mode through which such recognition manifests and is 
operationalized in the marketplace. What emerges is a complex tale: a 
celebration of ownership in its connection with personhood, combined with 
a measured wariness of property in its connection with alienability and the 
conditions of capitalist exchange. The line she draws between the discourse 
of intellectual property rights and the empowerment of African American 
performers, for example, explicitly proceeds along the same path of 
principled pragmatism taken by critical race theorist Patricia Williams with 
respect to the discourse of rights in general (p. 131).7 Rather than arguing 
for or against choreographic copyright or legal reform, Kraut contends only 
and importantly that “copyright and choreography productively illuminate 
one another and the workings of race and gender in American dance” (p. 5).  
The book is divided into five chapters with an introduction and a coda. The 
Introduction, entitled “Dance Plus Copyright,” acquaints the reader with 
copyright’s tentative presence in the world of dance, and with the dance 
world’s tentative embrace of copyright. While acknowledging the 
problematic (sometimes even farcical) (p. 2)8 nature of efforts to own 
physical movement in the digital age, Kraut points the reader firmly 
towards the racial dynamics of appropriation and ownership, insisting from 
the outset that it is insufficient to simply dismiss choreographic copyright as 
either folly or futile. Rather, the challenge is to recognize that “[q]uestions 
of who possesses the rights to which movement, of who is authorized to 
borrow from whom, and of who profits from the circulation of dance are all 
entangled in the legacies of racial injustice” (p. 2). The Introduction is 
worth reading in its own right for its concise but surprisingly 
comprehensive overview of relevant debates in copyright theory (from 
public domain and free culture critiques of copyright’s expansion to 
concerns about its “Euro-modernist” origins and Western Enlightenment 
underpinnings) (p. 7), as well as its survey of raced and gendered 
conceptions of property (from labour and personhood theories to “whiteness 
as property”) (p. 27),9 and conceptions of materiality (commodification, 
embodiment and corporeality) in respect of both property and dance.  
The IP Law Book Review 24 
With this complex ground-work laid, Kraut embarks, in Chapters 1-5, to 
explore choreographic copyright case studies, drawing on a “combination of 
traditional performance sources and traditional legal sources,” to examine 
“how dance-makers with various degrees of privilege, working in the genres 
of modern dance, ballet, tap and jazz at various historical moments, 
engaged with the discourse and legal apparatus of intellectual property law” 
(p. 41). In telling these stories, Kraut mines them for illuminating lessons on 
“the ways dancers both participate in and resist the commodification of their 
embodied work, the stakes involved in that participation and resistance, and 
the effects of race and gender on both” (p. 41).   
Chapter 1 relays the experience of a white, female modern dancer, Loïe 
Fuller, as she sought to claim ownership of her “stolen” “Serpentine Dance” 
(p. 64),10 culminating in the 1892 case of Fuller v. Bemiss.11 The case is 
cited quite frequently in the choreography context for the derisive manner in 
which Fuller’s claim was dismissed by the court as falling short of the 
requirements of “dramatic composition.” Indeed, Judge Lacombe concluded 
that the “mere mechanical movements” of Fuller conveyed “no other idea 
than that a comely woman is illustrating the poetry of motion in a singularly 
graceful fashion.” The idea was “pleasing” but “hardly…dramatic” (p. 73). 
Kraut observes the gendered implications of the decision, noting how 
gracefulness and visual pleasure are attached to the female dancing body as 
object, while denying her “interiority” and “status as an authorial subject 
entitled to ownership” (p. 74).12 True to form, however, Kraut does not start 
or end her analysis there, but adds further layers of contradiction, 
introducing new tensions just as the more obvious conclusions were 
beginning to solidify. She notes, for example, that the “Serpentine Dance” 
was not the result of de novo origination but rather borrowed from Indian 
“nautch” dancing, introduced to the West through colonial cultural flows. 
When “white Western bodies” become the privileged interpreters and 
masters of Oriental dance, she contends, they lay claim to “Eastern ‘raw 
materials’ through their choreographic practice” (p. 63). With the disavowal 
of antecedents and the arrogation of proclaimed “creative genius” and 
“novelty,” Fuller is not presented simply as subordinated female subject, 
but also as privileged subject “claim[ing] the status of the white Romantic 
artist” (p. 65) and thereby seeking “to signal her distance from the chorus 
girls, skirt dancers, and Nautch dancers of the commercial stage” (p. 66) 
Kraut charts Fuller’s continued pursuit of intellectual property rights to 
“elevate her station,” navigating the “patriarchal organization of the mixed-
race commercial stage” (pp. 80-81). Ultimately, Kraut concludes that 
Fuller’s turn to the legal apparatus “must be seen at one and the same time 
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as an act of gendered resistance against a patriarchal system and an 
assertion of racial privilege within a system of white dominance” (p. 90).  
A similar narrative approach guides the reader through each subsequent 
chapter. The themes, tensions and interpretations that Kraut presents are 
constantly twisting and turning in on themselves, resisting the reader’s 
confident grasp, refusing to simplify the intersectionality of their subjects or 
the shifting, contextual nature of power. Chapter 2 delves into the 
relationship between race and property from the other side, exploring the 
efforts of Johnny Hudgins, an African American blackface comic 
pantomimist, to first defend himself against a breach of contract claim by 
denying his originality or individuality as a performer, and then to assert 
himself as an owner of copyright over his original act a few years later. 
Mining the contradiction, Kraut observes: “The irony of viewing Hudgins 
as a commodity that speaks and of viewing that speech as an affirmation of 
his personhood is that his speech…on some level reinforced the commodity 
status of his dancing body” (p. 125) In Chapter 3, Kraut examines how 
notions of property were both refuted and reinvented amongst African 
American dancers of the 1930s and 40s. Referencing the work of legal 
scholars such as Boatema Boateng and Yochai Benkler, (p. 157)13 Kraut 
argues that a shared tradition of “stealing steps” amongst African American 
vernacular dancers, combined with codes and conventions that governed 
borrowing, reveals “the ways in which notions of intellectual property play 
out in and around practices that the law refuses to recognize” (p. 164).  
1940s and ’50s Broadway is the focus of Chapter 4, which tracks the battle 
for choreographers’ copyright waged by white women such as Hannah 
Holm (who successfully registered the choreographic score for “Kiss Me 
Kate) and Agnes de Mille (the choreographer of “Oklahoma!”, whose 
advocacy later paved the way for the inclusion of choreography in the 1976 
Copyright Act). Their “success” is not, however, the full story. In her telling 
of the tale, Kraut emphasizes that “granting the choreographer intellectual 
property rights necessitates suppressing the non-autonomous and non-
original aspects of the creative process: its collaborations, its borrowings, 
and vitally, its dependence on the labour of racialized others” (p. 197). She 
then adds to the story Faith Dane’s 1962 common law copyright claim in 
the musical “Gypsy,” dismissed because her performance of “bumps, 
grinds, [and] pelvic contractions” could not rise to “the status of a property 
right.”14 By juxtaposing these case studies, Kraut underscores how 
decisions about copyrightability (and so access to “the rights of possessive 
individualism”) (p. 216) are rife with distinctions between high and low art, 
intellectual and physical labour, moral virtue and morally suspect sexuality.  
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The final chapter provides a thorough account of the two major 
choreography copyright cases post-1976: one that upheld the infringement 
claim of the George Ballanchine estate;15 and the other that denied the 
ownership and infringement claim of Martha Graham’s estate.16 Having 
emphasized the embodied nature of the choreographic work throughout the 
book, Kraut tugs on this string, asking, “what does the irrevocable loss of 
the choreographer’s body [in death] mean for the figure of the author and 
for the afterlife of the choreographic work?” (p. 221). She beautifully 
captures the significance of copyright’s romantic author trope, noting that 
after the literal deaths of two great American dance icons, “what was 
implicitly on trial in their copyright lawsuits…was nothing less than the 
choreographer-as-genius” (p. 228).  Perhaps it ought not to surprise us, then, 
that it was the male genius who persisted as possessive individual post-
mortem, “entitled to the historically white masculine privilege of propertied 
personhood” (p. 262).   
If the racialized and gendered dynamics and power flows of choreographic 
copyright were beginning to seem clear, however, a final twist is presented 
in the Coda, which explores the controversy around African American pop 
star Beyoncé’s evident copying, in her “Countdown” music video, of 
Belgian choreographer De Keersmaeker’s acclaimed modern dance “Rosas 
danst Rosas.” This offers the opportunity for Kraut to break from her U.S.-
frame, panning out to transnational dimensions of cross-border cultural 
flows, and the implications of choreography’s digital circulation. In a 
controversy involving parties at “opposing poles” in the contemporary 
dance landscape, it might have been tempting to present this twist as an 
optimistic turn: the empowered black female performing artist successfully 
appropriating white, avant-garde art, thereby “invert[ing] the historical 
pattern of acclaimed white artists taking from non-white dancers” (p. 268). 
The tale could have been one of racial and gender progress, revealing the 
power of art, in the internet age, to unsettle social hierarchies on the world 
stage. (pp. xvii-xviii) Resisting such a tidy final act, however, Kraut instead 
invites us to consider how the critical response to Beyoncé’s appropriations 
reveals continuing anxieties around the appropriate flow of choreographic 
traffic (pp. 265-266). Beyoncé’s reproduction (“re-embodiment”) (p. 276) 
of the choreography within commercial “global pop culture” (“coded 
black”) (p. 274), was “a tacit attenuation of white privilege,” which could 
be reclaimed only by reasserting authorial control. Having accused Beyoncé 
of “stealing,” De Keersmaeker’s decision to run a “Rosas Remix Project” 
and invite the public to upload their own versions of the choreography does 
not read, to Kraut, as a concession to the post-proprietary circulation of 
digitized dance in a participatory online environment: paradoxically, 
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perhaps, it looks more like an alternative copyright claim: “an attempt to 
regulate choreography’s reproduction and to separate out the right kind of 
circulation from the wrong” (p. 280).  
The picture Kraut paints, in the telling of these stories, is not ultimately one 
of progress, or even evolution, but one about the intractability of race and 
gender as hierarchizing constructions that continuously regulate the role of 
author and the privilege of proprietorship.   
Most of the choreography copyright cases examined in Kraut’s book and 
outlined above have made appearances elsewhere in the existing literature 
on copyright in choreographic works. Perhaps most notably, interesting 
accounts of an overlapping array of cases, similarly focused on emphasizing 
the privileging of whiteness and the presumed masculinity of authorship are 
provided by Caroline Picart in her excellent book, CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY AND COPYRIGHT IN AMERICAN DANCE.17 While I would 
have appreciated a more carefully articulated explanation of the 
commonalities and differences between Picart’s and Kraut’s account of this 
legal history,18 I found both to be valuable and much needed contributions 
to the landscape of critical copyright theory. Indeed, I hope that Kraut’s 
book and Picart’s represent the start of a new wave of critical and 
interdisciplinary work in this field. I have argued elsewhere that the 
increasing number of controversies around choreographic “appropriation” 
in popular culture, such as those levelled against Beyoncé’s music videos, 
raises the specter of choreography as a new front in digital copyright wars.19 
Whether or not that proves to be true, there is no question that 
choreographic copyright offers up a fertile terrain within which to explore 
the contours of copyright law, challenging and rethinking how the law 
constructs and values the author, authorship, and the work. Far from 
competing over the same academic territory, there is plenty of room here for 
many more voices to enter the fray. 
As for Kraut’s voice, it is possible that her prose will be a little off-putting 
to some, straying as it occasionally does from the richly poetic to the 
potentially opaque. Readers familiar with the terminology, theoretical 
constructs, jargon and style of writing in socio-cultural and gender studies 
will undoubtedly feel more at home than those used to the typical legal 
academic terrain. Certainly, the writing can be dense, and the book is not a 
quick and easy read. But the reader is rewarded for her persistence. After 
all, Kraut’s objective is not to simplify the role of copyright, race or gender 
in the stories she is telling, but to convince the reader of their complex 
interplay. She does so in a way that seems almost to revel in their context-
specific contradictions. Embracing the complexities and exposing the 
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contradictions, Kraut offers a deeply nuanced account of a tangled “knot of 
recurrent issues: raced and gendered hierarchies in the theatrical 
marketplace; white women’s complication relationship to property rights; 
legacies of ownership of black bodies and appropriation of non-white labor; 
copyright as a discourse of domination and of resistance; the contradictions 
of self-ownership; and the tension between dance’s ephemerality and its 
reproducibility.” (p. xvii)  
CHOREOGRAPHING COPYRIGHT is an illuminating book about 
copyright’s complicated engagement with choreographic expression in the 
United States, written “from a critical dance studies perspective that 
foregrounds race and gender” (p. xvii). It deserves a thoughtful reading by a 
wide audience within the IP academy, but will be of particular interest to 
anyone whose work brings a critical or interdisciplinary lens to bear on 
issues of copyrightability, authorship, ownership, equality, and the 
circulation of ideas within and across creative communities.   
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